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O'DONOVAN V McINTOSH: CHANGING THE CON-
TOURS OF MAINE'S EASEMENT LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
In O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1 a real estate developer, Timothy O'Donovan, 2
brought an action seeking, in part, a declaratory judgment concerning the transfer-
ability of an easement that he purchased from the defendant, John A. McIntosh,
Jr.3 O'Donovan and McIntosh subsequently filed a joint motion for partial sum-
mary judgment to obtain a ruling that would affirm the assignability of the ease-
ment in question.4 Susan Huggins, the owner of the servient estate upon which the
easement in question imposed, objected to this motion as a third party defendant. 5
She filed a cross-motion for summary judgment maintaining that the easement in
question was not transferable.6 The trial court agreed with Huggins and granted
her motion.7 O'Donovan and McIntosh appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine, sitting as the Law Court.8
After first determining that the disputed easement was an easement in gross, 9
the issue before the Law Court became whether such easements were capable of
assignment. 10 In a 4-2 decision, the Law Court elected to reverse the trial court
and held that the assignability of easements in gross depended upon a determina-
tion of the intent of the parties. 11
In so holding, the Law Court changed the contours of Maine's easement law.
Before O'Donovan, Maine courts adhered to the school of thought that easements
in gross were personal rights and, therefore, not assignable. 12 In an attempt to
discern whether the court was correct in overturning its past decisions regarding
easements in gross, this Note examines the legal background of these property
interests, examining in particular the assignability of the different types of ease-
ments in gross. This Note also explores contemporary views on the subject and
delves into the present state of the law as it exists in a number of jurisdictions.
1. 1999 ME 71,728A.2d 681.
2. The plaintiff/appellant, Timothy P. O'Donovan, is the president of Black Bear Develop-
ment, Inc. See iUL 4, 728 A.2d at 683.
3. The action was brought pursuant to ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5951-5963 (West 1980).
4. See O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1999 ME 71,1 6, 728 A.2d at 683.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See icL
9. See id. 7, 728 A.2d at 683. "An easement is in gross when it is not created to benefit or
when it does not benefit the possessor of any tract of land in his use of it as such possessor."
RESTATEmENT oF PRoPEmT § 454 (1944).
10. See O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1999 ME 71, 7, 728 A.2d at 683.
11. See id. Justice Dana wrote the opinion of the court, and he was joined by Rudman,
Alexander, and Calkins. Justice Saufley took no part in the consideration of the case.
12. See O'Neill v. Williams, 527 A.2d 322, 323 (Me. 1987) ("An easement in gross is a
purely personal right, is not assignable, and terminates upon the death of the individual for
whom it was created."); Davis v. Briggs, 117 Me. 536, 540, 105 A. 128, 129 (1918) (noting that
..an easement in gross which, because of its personal nature.. .is not assignable or inheritable").
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Finally, this Note concludes that the Law Court correctly held that the McIntosh
easement was assignable. However, its general ruling, that all easements in gross
are capable of assignment depending upon the intent of the parties, was overly
broad.
IL THE NATURE OF EASEMENTS
An easement can be broadly defined as "[a]n interest in land owned by an-
other person, consisting in the right to use or control the land, or an area above or
below it, for a specific limited purpose ... ,13 It may also be thought of as an
"incorporeal right or hereditament to which property is rendered subject."' 14 The
holder of an easement does not receive title to the land affected by the easement
but instead receives the right to use that land in the specified manner.
Easements are sometimes confused with licenses. Like an easement, a license
in real property also allows one to come onto the property of another for a specific
purpose.15 However, the fundamental difference between easements and licenses
is that "[w]hile an easement implies an interest in land, a license is merely a per-
sonal privilege to do some particular act or series of acts on land without possess-
ing any estate or interest therein." 16 Although these rights may seem similar in
effect, they differ in nature. Because licenses are simply privileges, they are usu-
ally held to be "personal, revocable, and unassignable." 17 On the other hand,
easements, as interests in land, are not revocable, 18 and depending upon the type
of easement, are capable of assignment.
Although the law of each state may differ, easements can generally be created
through an express or implied grant, 19 prescription,20 reservation,2 1 necessity,2 2
13. BLAck's LAW DicnoNAw 527 (7th ed. 1999). An easement is defined by the Rz -mrr
OF PnPomry § 450 (1944) as:
[ain interest in land in the possession of another which
(a) entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or enjoyment of the land
in which the interest exists;
(b) entitles him to protection as against third persons from interference in such
use or enjoyment;
(c) is not subject to the will of the possessor of the land;
(d) is not a normal incident of the possession of any land posese by the owner
of the interest, and
(e) is capable of creation by conveyance.
Id.
14. 25 AM. Ju. 2D Easements and Licenses § 2 (1996).
15. See id. § 3.
16. Condry v. Laurie, 41 A.2d 66, 68 (Md. 1945).
17. Smith v. Royal Ins. Co., Ill F.2d 667,670 (9th Cir. 1940) (quoting Gravelly Ford Canal
Co. v. Pope and Talbot Land Co., 178 P. 155, 163 (Cal. App. 1989)). See also McCastle v.
Scanlon, 59 N.W.2d 114, 120 (Mich. 1953) (quoting Morrill v. Macldnon, 24 Mich. 279, 1872
WL 3197, at *2); Towles v. Hodges, 108 So.2d 884, 886 (Miss. 1959).
18. See, e.g., Russell v. Martin, 88 So.2d 315,317 (Fla. 1956).
19. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johnston, 990 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Ark. App. 1999) (finding an ease-
ment created by a grant).
20. See, e.g., Collins Trust v. Allamakee County Bd., 599 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1999)
(recognizing easements created by prescription).
21. See, e.g., Knox County Stone Co. v. Bellefontaine Quarry, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 356, 360
(Mo. App. 1998) (recognizing easements created by reservation).
22. See, e.g., Cleek v. Povia, 515 So.2d 1246, 1247 (Ala. 1987) (acknowledging the legality
of easements created by necessity).
2000]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
pre-existing use,2 3 devise,2 4 and through the equitable doctrine of estoppel.25 Once
created, there are two different classifications of easements: the easement appur-
tenant and the easement in gross. The easement appurtenant is one that is con-
nected to a dominant estate and exists to benefit the owner of that estate in his use
of it.2 6 This easement is generally held to run with the dominant estate, meaning
that a transfer in the ownership of the dominant estate also transfers the right to
benefit from the easement. 27 The easement in gross, however, is not connected or
attached to a dominant estate but exists to benefit the possessor irrespective of the
possessor's ownership in any particular land.2 8 Therefore, an important distinc-
tion between the two types of easements is that a dominant estate exists with an
easement appurtenant and no dominant estate exists with an easement in gross.
The easement in gross has been further divided into commercial easements in gross
and noncommercial easements in gross.29 Depending upon the jurisdiction, whether
an easement in gross is capable of assignment may very well depend upon its
commercial or noncommercial nature.
iI. HISTORY OF THE ASSIGNABIlRY OF EASEMENTS IN GROSS
A. Legal Background Concerning Noncommercial Easements in Gross
The assignability of noncommercial easements in gross is a much disputed
area of the law. Some early court decisions held that easements in gross could be
assigned or inherited.30 Traditionally, however, the law has deemed easements in
23. See, e.g., Wright v. Horse Creek Ranches, 697 P.2d 384, 387 (Colo. 1985) (acknowledg-
ing the legality of easements created by a pre-existing use).
24. See, e.g., Schatz v. Schatz, 419 N.W.2d 903, 907 (N.D. 1988) (finding that a particular
will granted an easement rather than a fee simple absolute title).
25. See, e.g., Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762,774 (3d Cir.
1994) (finding an easement created by estoppel); see also Am. JuiR. 2D Easements and Licenses
§ 16 (1996).
26. See RsArAET oFr PROPr § 453 (1944); 2 AMEmRCAN LAW OF PROPEMRT § 8.6 (A. James
Casner ed., 1952).
27. See, e.g., LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984,989 (Me. 1979); Passaic Valley Council Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Hartwood Syndicate, 361 N.Y.S.2d 945, 947 (App. Div. 1974); Lester Coal
Corp. v. Lester, 122 S.E.2d 901,904 (Va. 1961); Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples, 41 N.E. 441,
445 (Mass. 1895).
28. See REasTAr TmroF PRoPERTY § 454 (1944); 2 AmmcAN LAw or PRopmt § 8.9 (A. James
Casner ed., 1952).
29. See REsTATEffENT or PPoPmUT §§ 489, 491 (1944).
30. See Senhouse v. Christian, 99 Eng. Rep. 1251 (K.B. 1787). In Senhouse, the plaintiff
brought a trespass action against the defendant for unlawfully using a path located on the plaintiff's
property. See id. The defendant claimed that he was entitled to use the pathway on account of
an easement that he had inherited from his grandfather. See id. at 1252. The court first found
that the plaintiff held good title to the disputed path. See id. However, the court further found
that the plaintiff had granted "a free and convenient way... together with full and free license to
and for the said John Christian deceased [defendant's grandfather], his heirs and assigns .... "
Id. In deciding the case, the court acknowledged that the purported easement had been granted
to the defendant's grandfather in gross. See id. at 1256. Nevertheless, the court unanimously
found that the defendant was entitled to use the right of way. See id. The court did, however,
find for the plaintiff on the grounds that the defendant had used the right of way in a manner
inconsistent with the original grant of the easement. See id. at 1257. In White v. Crawford, 10
Mass. 183 (1813). the plaintiff claimed a right of way across the defendant's property and brought
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gross to be personal in nature and, therefore, has categorically refused to allow
their transfer. This notion has been derived from the decision handed down by the
old English Court of Common Pleas in the case ofAckroyd v. Smith.3 1 In Ackroyd,
the plaintiff granted to Smith a certain plot of land and a right of way over a par-
ticular road.3 2 When the successors of Smith3 3 used the right of way, the plaintiff
brought a trespass action against them.3 4 The court granted the plaintiff relief,
finding that the original conveyance of the right of way to Smith was "uncon-
nected with the enjoyment or occupation of the land .... ,35 The court went on to
hold that "[i]f a way be granted in gross, it is personal only, and cannot be as-
signed." 36
An Illinois court held in a similar manner in the case of Garrison r. Rudd.37
where the court found that a disputed easement was one in gross. 38 The court first
determined that the deed that sought to grant the easement merely conveyed "a
personal right, wholly independent of [the grantor's] domicil .... ."39 The court
then stated that "since a way appendant cannot be turned into gross, because it is
inseparably united to the land to which it is incident, so a way in gross cannot be
granted over, because of its being attached to the person."40
Twenty years after the Garrison decision, the case of Boatman . Lasley41
came before the Supreme Court of Ohio. In Boatman, the court was called upon to
resolve the same issue of whether an easement in gross was capable of being trans-
ferred.4 2 The court held:
an action in trespass against him when he attempted to block it. See id. at 186. The plaintiff
claimed to have inherited the easement from her deceased husband. See id. at 187. The defen-
dant argued that the easement in question was one in gross, and should be construed as a per-
sonal grant to the plaintiff's husband only. See id. The court stated: "As to ways in gross, that
they may be granted, or may accrue, in various forms, to one and his heirs and assigns, there can
be no doubt." Id. at 188. The court held in favor of the plaintiff. See id. at 189.
31. 138 Eng. Rep. 68 (C.P. 1850).
32. See id. at 76.
33. Defendants Samuel and Thomas Smith.
34. See Ackroyd v. Smith, 138 Eng. Rep. at 77.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 19 Ill. 558 (App. Ct. 1858).
38. Taylor owned two plots of land that were divided by a public roadway. See id. at 560.
One of the plots of land was located on the banks of a river. See 1d. He sold the riverside plot to
Rudd, reserving in the deed an easement over the land to get to the river. See id. This deed made
no mention of Taylor's second plot of land. See id. A number of years after this sale, Taylor sold
the second plot of land to Garrison. See id. This deed not only conveyed the second plot of land
but also purported to convey the reserved easement over Rudd's land. See id. When Garrison
used this easement, Rudd brought an action in trespass. See id. at 558. The trial court found for
Rudd and Garrison excepted. See id. at 559. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, holding that
Taylor's reserved easement was in gross and was not appurtenant to the second plot of land. See
id. at 564.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 564-65.
41. 23 Ohio St. 614 (1878).
42. See id. at 617. The original action was brought by Lasley to foreclose on a mortgage that
Boatman had taken out to finance the purchase of the lands mortgaged. See id. Boatman brought
a counterclaim arguing that Lasley had breached a covenant that the land was to be free from
encumbrances. See id. at614-15. Apparently, Lasley had previously granted a right of way over
2000]
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A mere naked right to pass and repass over the land of another, a use which
excludes all participation in the profits of the land, is not, in any proper sense, an
interest or estate in the land itself. Such a right is in its nature personal; it at-
taches itself to the person of him to whom it is granted, and must die with the
person. 43
The court's most serious reservations about sanctioning the assignability of ease-
ments in gross pertained to the uncertainty that would surround the divisibility of
such interests, and also to the risk of surcharge 44 upon the servient estate.4 5 The
court inquired:
If such right be an inheritable estate, how will the heirs take? In severalty, in
joint tenancy, coparcenary, or as tenants in common? If not in severalty, how can
their interests be severed?
If [the easement in gross] be assignable, what limit can be placed on the
power of alienation? To whom and to how many may it be transferred? Why not
to the public at large, and thus convert into a public way that which was intended
to be a private and exclusive way only?46
Even today, close to one hundred and fifty years after the Ackroyd v. Smith deci-
sion, a number ofjurisdictions still adhere to its holding and do not allow noncom-
mercial easements in gross to be assigned.47 Although the Ackroyd doctrine still
persists, there is a growing sentiment that easements in gross should be capable of
assignment. 4 8 The Restatement of Property states: "The alienability of noncom-
the land to "Logue, his heirs and assigns .... ." Id. at 617. Logne then conveyed his land
together with the right of way to another party. See id. at 615. Boatman did not allege that
Logne owned any of the land appurtenant to the right of way at the time the grant was made to
him. See id. Neither did Boatman allege that the disputed right of way ever became appurtenant
to any land. See id. The jury was instructed that if they found that Logue did not own any of the
land appurtenant to the right of way, at the time of its grant, then the easement was personal in
nature and incapable of transfer. See id. at 616. The jury awarded Boatman one hundred dollars.
See id. at 615. Nevertheless, Boatman appealed citing as error the jury instructions. See id. at
616. The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the jury instructions. See id. at 619.
43. Id. at 618.
44. A surcharge can be defined as an additional, excessive burden. See BLAcK's LAW DIcno-
NARY 1455 (7th ed. 1999).
45. See Boatman v. Lasley, 23 Ohio St. at 618.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Rose Lawn Cemetery Ass'n v. Scott, 317 S.W.2d 265 (Ark. 1958); West v.
Smith, 511 P.2d 1326 (Idaho 1973); Stockdale v. Yerden, 190 N.W. 225 (Mich. 1922); Shingleton
v. State, 133 S.E.2d 183 (N.C. 1963); Cadawalder v. Bailey, 23 A. 20 (R.I. 1891); Brasington v.
Williams, 141 S.E. 375 (S.C. 1927); Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist., 436 P.2d
230 (Utah 1968); Lester Coal Corp. v. Lester, 122 S.E.2d 901 (Va. 1961).
48. See, e.g., RasTAm Nr oF PIormErY § 491 (1944) ("The alienability of noncommercial
easements in gross is determined by the manner or the terms of their creation."); 2 AmmcAN
LAW OF PRoPE=r § 8.82 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) ("There seems to be no reason to deny to
parties who create easements in gross the privilege of making them alienable if they wish to do
so."); 4 RicHARD R. PoWa., POWL.L ON REAL PROP'rv § 34.16, at 34-218 (1998) (stating that
the only barriers to the alienability of easements in gross are the manifest intent of the parties to
disallow alienation and a misplaced fear of a "resultant surcharge" on the land); 3 HEnER
TnomncxTn7Awy, TiWFANY ON REAL PRopmrry § 761 (Supp. 1998) ("iThere is a growing recog-
nition of the assignability of all easements in gross except those demonstrably intended to ben-
efit only the individual who is its first recipient."); Alan David Hegi, Note, The Easement in
Gross Revisited: Transferability and Divisability Since 1945, 39 VAm. L. Rav. 109, 113-14
[Vol. 52:2
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mercial easements in gross is determined by the manner or the terms of their cre-
ation. ' 4 9 This view acknowledges that a number of these interests are personal in
nature; nonetheless, it seeks to effectuate the intent of the parties. Some states
have subscribed to this view either through the enactment of statutes 50 or by court
decision.5 1
One of the earliest court decisions that denounced the Ackroyd doctrine and
espoused this view was the New Jersey case of Weber v. Dockray.52 In Weber, the
Chancery Division of the New Jersey Superior Court was called upon to determine
the question of whether the grant of a particular easement conveyed an alienable
interest. 53 William 0. Robinson, along with two other individuals, owned Lot 29
on New Jersey's Raccoon Island.54 Nordyke Metzger owned the neighboring Lots
30 and 31.55 On December 7, 1939, Robinson and Metzger entered into a written
agreement that purported to convey to "Robinson, his heirs and assigns forever
'the right to store one automobile in the northwesterly half of the garage now
situate on Lot 31 ... together with the right of access and egress to said garage
from the highway ... .",56 In 1944, Robinson, along with his co- owners, con-
veyed Lot 29 to the defendant, Lancelot Dockray.57 At the same time, Robinson
also conveyed to Dockray the easement he had received from Metzger.58 Subse-
(1986) ("[C]ourts must recognize and overcome theAckryd restriction to deal with the current
role of the easement in gross."); Gerald P. Welsh, The Assignability of Easements in Gross, 12
U. Cm L. REv. 276,278 (1945) ("[Aln easement in gross is ordinarily a present interest in land
such as we normally expect to be assignable, and there appear to be no reasons of public policy
to prevent the grantor's intention from being carried out by making such an Interest freely alien-
able.").
49. REgm~.mm oF Paormuy § 491 (1944). The Restatement of Propeny also provides a list
of factors to be considered when attempting to discern the transferability of an easement in gross
from its terms of creation:
(a) the personal relations existing at the time of creation between the owner of
the easement and the owner of the servient tenement;
(b) the extent of the probable increase in the burden on the servient tenement
resulting from the alienability of the easement either by increasing the physical use of
the land or by decreasing its value;
(c) the consideration paid for the easement.
Id § 492.
50. See, e.g., ND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-2-1 (Michie 1995).
51. See, e.g., Collier v. Oelke, 21 Cal. Rptr. 140, 142 (Ct. App. 1962) (noting that"the settled
rule in California [is] that an easement in gross is property and can be transferred"); Lindley v.
Maggert, 645 P.2d 430,431 (Mont. 1982) (noting that an easement is freely alienable unless an
express provision in the deed prohibits alienation); Weber v. Dockray, 64 A.2d 631, 633 (NJ.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949) ("[The] right to transfer an easement in gross, depends upon the inten-
tion of the parties as shown by the language of the grant; the deinite and fixed nanre of the
burden upon the servient tenement and the circumstances existing at the time the grant was
made[sic]."); Farmer's Marine Copper Works, Inc. v. City of Galveston, 757 S.W.2d 148, 151
(Tex. App. 1988) (holding that "the parties may create an assignable easement in gross through
an express assignment provision").
52. 64 A.2d 631 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949).
53. See id. at 632.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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quently, Robinson passed away. The following year, Metzger conveyed his lots to
Wright, who shortly thereafter conveyed the property to the plaintiff, Weber.59 At
all times throughout these conveyances, the deeds to Lots 30 and 31 recited that
the property was made subject to the original Robinson/Metzger grant.60
The court decided that the easement granted to Robinson was capable of be-
ing transferred and, therefore, upheld its conveyance to Dockray.6 1 In coming to
this determination, the court followed the widely accepted principle 62 that in order
to favor the alienation of such interests, one should construe, whenever possible,
an easement to be appurtenant rather than in gross. 63 After examining the nature
of the properties and the language of the grant, the court found that the easement
could reasonably be interpreted as appurtenant. 64 Although the court based its
decision on this determination, it went on to state that even assuming that the grant
resulted "in the creation of an easement in gross, it does not necessarily follow that
the easement expired with the death of Robinson." 6 5 The court acknowledged the
Ackroyd doctrine and the considerable jurisprudence that had adopted it. How-
ever, it noted that there was "a growing tendency to recognize the right to transfer
easements in gross and to protect them as assignable interests in real estate."'66
Moreover, the court stated: "There would appear to be no logical reason why, if he
chose to do so, a man could not grant to another an interest in his land entirely
irrespective of the grantee's possession of another estate." 67 The court concluded
that an easement in gross should be capable of assignment if the parties so in-
tended.6 8
More recently, in 1982, the ca3e of Lindley v. MaggertO9 was decided in Mon-
tana. In Lindley, Sam Shimamoto parchased land from Stephen Pinnow.7 0 Within
the deed that conveyed the land, Pinnow expressly reserved a roadway easement
over the property.7 1 Subsequently, Pinnow conveyed this easement to a number of
landowners, including the plaintiff Lindley, who owned property in a tract of land
originally owned by Pinnow's father.72 Shimamoto eventually sold his property
to the defendant, Kurtis Maggert.73 When Maggert obstructed the right of way
provided by the easement, Lindley brought suit.74 The trial court, faced with the
question of whether the easement rights could be transferred, held that the ease-
ment was valid and capable of being assigned.75
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id at 633.
62. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
63. Weber v. Dockray, 64 A.2d at 633.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. 645 P.2d 430 (Mont. 1982).
70. See id.at431.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 431-32.
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On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court determined from the language of the
original reservation that the resulting easement was one in gross.76 Furthermore,
the court stated that "[w]hether or not such an easement may be alienated and
apportioned depends upon the manner and the terms of the creation of the ease-
ment."7 7 Finding no language in the deed that sought to limit the grantor's right to
alienate the easement, the court upheld the trial court's decision. 78
Although such decisions evidence a trend toward abandoning the Ackroyd rule, the
question regarding the alienability of noncommercial easements in gross remains
a hotly debated issue.
B. Legal Background Concerning Commercial Easements in Gross
The commercial easement in gross evolved from the profit a prendre. A profit
A prendre is "[a] right or privilege to go on another's land and take away something
of value from its soil or from the products of its soil ... -"79 Although profits a
prendre, like easements, afe interests in land,8 0 they differ from easements in the
nature of the rights that they embody. Whereas a profit A prendre grants "the power
and the privilege to acquire through severance, ownership of some part of the physi-
cal substances included in the possession of land,"81 an easement simply confers a
right to enjoy land without transferring any rights in the soil of that land.82
Like easements, profits A prendre may be appurtenant or in gross.8 3 Histori-
cally, however, profits 6 prendre held in gross have been capable of assignment. In
1583, the King's Bench decided in Mountjoyes Case84 that a reservation by deed
to mine for ore and dig for turf was assignable.8 5 American courts have also long
recognized the alienability of the profit a prendre. 86
The "commercial" easement in gross is said to have arisen out of problems
concerning the assignability of railroad easements. 87 In 1857, Junction Railroad
Co. v. Ruggles88 was decided in Ohio. The Ohio Railroad Company was incorpo-
rated by an act of the Ohio General Assembly in 1836.89 It was vested with the
right to construct a railroad to begin in the eastern part of the state and run westerly
76. See id. at 431.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 431-32.
79. BicK's LAw DicnoNARY 1227 (7th ed. 1999).
80. See, e.g., Hoglund v. Omak Wood Products, Inc., 914 P.2d 1197, 1200 n.2 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1996).
81. United States v. Gossler, 60 F. Supp. 971,974 (D. Or. 1945).
82. See, e.g., Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Penney, 4 So.2d 167, 169 (Ala. 1941); see also
Ai. Jut. 2D Easements and Licenses § 4 (1996).
83. See, e.g., Merriam v. First National Bank of Akron, 587 So.2d 584, 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
1991).
84. 74 Eng. Rep. 786, (K.B. 1583).
85. See id. at 786.
86. See, e.g., Engel v. Ayer, 85 Me. 448,455,457,27 A. 352,355 (1893) (holding that a right
to tie booms to a pier was a profit h prendre and, therefore, assignable); Boatman v. Lasley, 23
Ohio St. 614, 618-19 (1873) ("The [profit a prendre] so far partakes of the nature of an estate in
the land itself, as to be treated as an inheritable and assignable interest."); Cadawalder v. Bailey,
23 A. 20, 22 (R.I. 1891) (noting that the profit h prendre is itself an interest in the land).
87. See 2 ANICAN LAw OF PRoFaatt § 8.83, at 295 & n.1 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
88. 7 Ohio St. 1 (1857).
89. See id. at 2.
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through several Ohio counties before terminating.9 0 Pursuant to this right, Ohio
Railroad began to acquire rights of way along the proposed path of the tracks. One
of these rights of way was secured from Almon Ruggles. 9 1 In 1837, the Ohio
Railroad Company received a loan from the state amounting to one hundred and
fifty thousand dollars.92 However, in 1842, the railroad neglected to pay the inter-
est on the loan and as a result, its property, including the rights of way, was seized
by the governor.9 3 The seized property was then auctioned to the highest bidder
and sold to Lane.94 Lane, in turn, sold the property to the Junction Railroad Com-
pany.95 When Junction sought to occupy the right of way originally acquired from
Almon Ruggles, Richard Ruggles,9 6 the then owner of the servient estate, threat-
ened to bring a trespass action against them.97 In response to these threats, Junc-
tion filed a bill requesting a decree that would permanently enjoin Ruggles from
interfering with its rights. 98
In deciding this case in favor of the Junction Railroad Company, the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld the transfer of the right of way and, in so doing, created an
exception to its rule that easements in gross were not assignable. 99 The court first
noted that the question of the alienability of a railroad easement was one of first
impression. 10o Though the court acknowledged the then well-established prin-
ciples regarding the transferability of easements in gross and easements appurte-
nant, it sought to differentiate the railroad easement from either kind. 10 1 The court
determined that the railroad easement was "sui generis, and must be governed by
reasons peculiar to itself... ."102 Moreover, the court mentioned that "a railroad,
strictly speaking, is neither a person nor real estate ... ."103 However, for pur-
poses of assignability, the court equated the railroad right of way with an easement
appurtenant, reasoning that "[1]ike real estate, a railroad is--or at least the Ohio
Railroad was-expected to be of perpetual duration." 104 Essentially, the court
held that when Almon Ruggles originally granted the right of way to the Ohio
Railroad Company, it was with the understanding that it would be for perpetu-
ity.105 Therefore, the court decided that it would be wrong to allow Richard Ruggles
to compel further compensation. 106
90. See id.
91. SeeMi.
92. See id. at 3.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 4.
95. See id.
96. Almon Ruggles had died sometime after he granted the right of way to the Ohio Railroad
Company. See id. Richard Ruggles was his son and the devisee to part of the land encumbered
by the grant. See id.
97. See id. at 5.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 7-8.
100. See id. at 6.
101. See id. at 7.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 10.
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Through the years, the assignable commercial easement in gross has been
recognized in a number of jurisdictions and has grown to encompass a variety of
rights of way. 107 Courts have been much less adamant about restricting the alien-
ability of commercial easements in gross than they have been with noncommercial
easements in gross, partly because they feel that the latter are personal in nature,
while the former have economic roots. However, the distinction between the two
is not always obvious. The Restatement of Property provides that "[e]asements in
gross, if of a commercial character, are alienable... ."108 The Restatement notes
that "[a]n easement in gross is of a commercial character when the use authorized
by it results primarily in economic benefit rather than personal satisfaction."10 9
This determination may, at times, be difficult to make. Nevertheless, most courts
and legal treatises endorse the alienability of commercial easements in gross.
IV. THE O'DONOVAN DECISION
A brief examination of the development of easement law in Maine is neces-
sary to establish the context of the O'Donovan v. Mcntosh1 10 decision. In 1918,
the Maine Law Court, deciding Davis v. Briggs,1 11 stated its position on the issue
of the alienability of easements in gross. The case involved easement rights in
water flow from a spring. When faced with the question of whether the easement
was in gross or appurtenant, the court spoke of an easement in gross as "not as-
signable or inheritable."1 12 The court reiterated this same position, that an ease-
ment in gross is a "purely personal right, is not assignable, and terminates upon the
death of the individual for whom it was created," sixty-nine years later in the case
of O'Neill v. Williams. 113 This remained the law in Maine until the decision in
O'Donovan v. McIntosh.
A summary of important background facts is helpful in understanding the
O'Donovan case. John A. McIntosh Jr. was a licensed real estate broker and had
been for some time.114 In 1987, he decided to purchase a plot of land in Falmouth,
Maine.115 This plot was bordered on one side by a second plot of land known as
107. See, e.g., ChampaignNat'l Bank v. Illinois Power Co., 465 N.E.2d 1016,1021 (IlU.App.
Ct. 1984) (holding an easement in gross to maintain utilities as commercial and therefore as-
signable); Boorstein v. Mass Port Auth. 345 N.E.2d 668,669 (Mass. 1976) (pipeline easement);
Johnston v. Michigan ConsoL Gas Co., 60 N.W.2d 464, 469 (Mich. 1953) (pipeline rights);
Kansas City Area Transp. Auth. v. Ashley, 485 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (parldng
rights); Banach v. Home Gas Co., 199 N.Y.S.2d 858, 862 (Sup. CL 1960) (pipeline rights);
Sunset Lake Water Serv. Dist. v. Remington, 609 P.2d 896, 899 (Or. CL App. 1979) (right to lay
water lines); Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n, 200 A. 646, 651 (Pa. 1938) (boating,
fishing, and swimming rights in an artificial lake); Sandy Island Corp. v. Ragsdale, 143 SE.2d
803, 808 (S.C. 1965) (right of way over land for logging purposes); Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d
1062, 1067 (Utah 1984) (holding an easement in gross to graze cattle as commercial and there-
fore assignable).
108. REsTATnmorr oF PRoPm'nz § 489 (1944).
109. IdL § 489cmt. c.
110. 1999 ME 71, 728 A.2d 681.
111. 117 Me. 536, 105 A. 128 (1918).
112. Id. at 540, 105 A. at 129.
113. 527 A.2d 322,323 (Me. 1987).
114. See Brief of Appellants at 4. O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1999 ME 71, 728 A.2d 681 (No.
CUM-98-577).
115. See O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1999 ME 71, q 2, 728 A.2d at 682; see also Brief of
Appellants at 4.
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the Fish Parcel, and on the other side, by the public roadway, Foreside Road. 116
McIntosh had also purchased an option on the "Fish Parcel." 117 Eventually,
McIntosh's option on the Fish Parcel lapsed. 118 In 1989, he decided to sell his
land to Susan Huggins and also to reserve, through the deed, an alienable right of
way across the property connecting the Fish Parcel to Foreside Road. 119 Timothy
P. O'Donovan, president of Black Bear Development, Inc., subsequently purchased
the Fish Parcel with the intent to subdivide and develop it. 120 Because the Fish
Parcel was landlocked, O'Donovan also purchased the right of way from McIn-
tosh.121 Black Bear filed an application for subdivision approval with the Falmouth
Town Planning Board. 122 Huggins expressed concerns regarding the develop-
ment and opposed the transferability of the easement in dispute. 123 As a result of
the questions surrounding the alienability of the easement, the Planning Board
suspended its approval until the issue was resolved. 124
In O'Donovan v. McIntosh, O'Donovan brought suit against McIntosh seek-
ing, in part, a declaration in favor of the alienability of the easement that he had
purchased from him.125 McIntosh brought Huggins into the suit by filing a third
party complaint against her seeking damages for breach of contract, reformation,
116. See O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1999 ME 71, 2,728 A.2d at 682.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See id. The deed, in pertinent part, stated:
Excepting and reserving for the benefit of the Grantor and his heirs and assigns,
a right of way and easement for access (50) feet in width .... Said right of way and
easement shall (1) be for the purpose of ingress and egress to and from the lot herein
conveyed and other land adjacent to and behind the above described parcel, com-
monly known as the "Fish parcel" .... The assigns of the Grantor herein shall be
limited to those building and/or occupying a subdivision located on the above-men-
tioned "Fish parcel." Also reserving the right to install utilities ... over and under
said right of way for the use and benefit of said other land....
By acceptance of this deed the Grantor and Grantee agree to convey the right of
way above mentioned to the Town of Falmouth in the event that it shall be accepted as
a public way.
Id. 3, 728 A.2d at 682.
The deed also incorporated by reference a side agreement. See ic at 3, 728 A.2d at 683.
The third paragraph of the side agreement provided:
As further consideration for the conveyance of the property, I [Susan Huggins]
agree not to actively oppose any application for development permits for the parcel
served by the easement and will assent to the inclusion of my lot for purposes of the
Site Location of Development Law, (or any subsequent law) if required for permitting
purposes, in the event a development should be proposed for that property. I under-
stand that this agreement shall be binding upon any future purchaser of this property.
Appendix to Brief of Appellants at 77.
120. See O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1999 ME 71, 4,728 A.2d at 683; Brief of Appellants at
9-10.
121. See O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1999 ME 71, 4,728 A.2d at 683; Brief of Appellants at
10.
122. See O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1999 ME 71, 5, 728 A.2d at 683.
123. See Brief of Appellee at 4-5, O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1999 ME 71,728 A.2d 681 (No.
CUM-98-577).
124. See O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1999 ME 71, 5, 728 A.2d at 683.
125. See id. 6, 728 A.2d 683.
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rescission, unjust enrichment, estoppel, and contribution. 126 Subsequently,
O'Donovan and McIntosh filed a joint motion on partial summary judgment to
declare, as a matter of law, that the disputed easement was freely alienable. 127 In
response to this motion, Huggins filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 128
Huggins's motion primarily sought a declaration that would render the disputed
easement void. 129 The superior court, holding that the disputed easement was not
assignable, granted Huggins's motion for summary judgment. 130 O'Donovan and
McIntosh appealed to the Maine Law Court. 13 1
The appellants, O'Donovan and McIntosh [hereinafter O'Donovan], advanced
arguments before the Law Court to establish that the disputed easement was freely
alienable. Pointing to past Law Court decisions that focused on the intent of the
parties creating an easement, O'Donovan urged the Law Court to consider "the
intent of the parties to a deed ... in order to determine whether the easement in
question is alienable." 132 O'Donovan acknowledged the predominant doctrine
that easements in gross generally could not be assigned; however, he stressed that
the Law Court had refrained from consistently applying that rule.133 O'Donovan
also stressed that what was at issue was not "classifying the McIntosh easement as
being either 'appurtenant' or 'in gross. ' 134 He implored the Law Court to over-
look this "red herring" and focus instead on the parties' intent.135
O'Donovan then contended that the intent of the parties to a deed should be
determined by the deed itself.136 He posited that when a deed clearly and unam-
biguously expresses the will of the parties, "'[t]he intention of the parties, as ex-
pressed in the instrument, governs the interpretation of... [the] deed."' 137 Fur-
thermore, O'Donovan argued that under the law established in Fine Line, Inc. .
Blake138 and Milligan v. Milligan,139 extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent is not
to be considered unless the deed itself is unclear on the issue.140 O'Donovan then
argued that the plain language of the deed141 shows that both "parties intended
that the Commercial Easement be permanent and assignable." 142 Moreover, he
126. See id.; see also Brief of Appellee at 6, O'Donovan v. McIntosh. 1999 ME 71,728 A.2d
681 (No. CUM-98-577).
127. See O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1999 ME 71, 6, 728 A.2d at 683.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id
132. Brief of Appellants at 15.
133. See iU. (quoting Davis v. Briggs, 117 Me. 536, 105 A. 128 (1918)).
134. Id. at 16 n.3.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 18.
137. Id. at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting First Hartford Corp. v. Kennebec Water Dist.,
490A.2d 1209, 1211 (Me. 1985)).
138. 677 A.2d 1061, 1063-64 (Me. 1996) (stating that extrinsic evidence is admissable only
when the deed is ambiguous).
139. 624 A.2d 474,477 (Me. 1993) (stating that there must be a latent ambiguity for extrinsic
evidence to be considered).
140. See Brief of Appellants at 19.
141. See supra note 119 (quoting the language of the deed).
142. Brief of Appellants at 20.
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argued that the "Side Agreement" 14 3 that was incorporated into the deed consti-
tuted a contract in which Huggins further "expresse[d] her understanding that the
Commercial Easement would be used to access a potential subdivision on the Fish
Parcel.... "144 O'Donovan emphasized that the plain language of the deed and the
Side Agreement strongly supported the contention that the parties intended to cre-
ate an alienable easement of a commercial nature. 145
O'Donovan also urged the Law Court to continue following its jurisprudence
favoring, in all cases, the promotion of the alienability of property interests.14 6
Elaborating upon this jurisprudence, he referred to Maine's traditional rules of
construction that, whenever possible, the court should construe a grant or ease-
ment as being appurtenant, and therefore undeniably alienable. 147 He also re-
ferred to Law Court decisions that abolished the technical requirement that the
word "heirs" be used in order to reserve a lasting interest. 14 8 Furthermore,
O'Donovan posited that Maine law classifies a number of "rights as profits and
holds them to be alienable." 14 9
Finally, O'Donovan asserted that the easement in question was a commercial
easement in gross, which, according to the Restatement of Property, was freely
alienable. 150 He argued that the deed provided clear evidence that McIntosh re-
served the easement not for personal satisfaction but for purely economic rea-
sons. 15 1 Therefore, he implored the Law Court to follow the nationally recog-
nized rule that commercial easements in gross are alienable by holding that the
easement in question was assignable. 152
The Appellee, Susan Huggins, primarily argued on appeal that the disputed
easement was not capable of being assigned. She first contended that McIntosh
failed to reserve a valid interest at all. 153 Huggins argued categorically that ease-
ments appurtenant were transferable while easements in gross were not. 154 She
claimed that the intent of the parties was only relevant in making the determination
of how to classify the easement. 155 She noted that "McIntosh did not own the Fish
Parcel .... Therefore, he could not, as a matter of law, have created a right
appurtenant to that land." 156 Furthermore, Huggins concluded that McIntosh de-
sired to create, in effect, an easement appurtenant to land he did not own, and
therefore, as a matter of law, the easement must necessarily fail.157
143. See supra note 119 (quoting the language of the Side Agreement).
144. Brief of Appellants at 21.
145. See id. at 22.
146. See id. at 22-23.
147. See id. at 23.
148. See id.
149. Id. (citing Engel v. Ayer, 85 Me. 448, 455-57, 27 A. 352, 355 (1893) (classifying a right
to place and maintain booms on a pier as an assignable profit A prendre)).
150. See id. at 25 (citing REsTATEEr or PRopmmr § 489 (1944)).
151. See id. at 28.
152. See id. at 25.
153. See Brief of Appellee at 12.
154. See id. at 13-14.
155. See id. at 12.
156. Id. at 15 (citing Labelle v. Blake, 1998 ME 165, 9,714 A.2d 145, 148).
157. See id.
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Huggins argued, in the alternative, that if the deed did create a valid interest,
at most it created an easement in gross to pass and repass over her land. 15 8 She
further argued that under Maine law such easements have never been assignable
and that the intent of the parties was irrelevant to a determination of an easement's
alienability.159 She stated that the Law Court has "never allowed the parties to
make up their own rules about what the legal incidents of such interests are once
they are classified."W16 Huggins refuted the O'Donovan claim that the deed cre-
ated a commercial easement in gross by stating that "[t]here is nothing inherently
commercial about it. ... [I]t exists merely to provide access to the back land. ' 16 1
Moreover, she asserted that even if the easement was commercial, the court, which
had held that profits Z prendre were alienable, had never before recognized the
commercial/noncommercial distinction. 162 Finally, Huggins urged the Law Court
to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis and to depart from its previous easement
policies "only when the most compelling of reasons demand change." 16 3
The O'Donovan court, in reversing the superior court, held that "the easement
is assignable because the parties clearly expressed that intent in the language of the
deed." 16 4 The court, although admitting that it had previously stated that ease-
ments in gross were not assignable, noted that it had never applied that rule "to
frustrate the parties' clear intent, as set forth in the deed, that the holder may assign
the easement.' 165 The court also stated that its decision was "consistent with our
general policy favoring the free alienability of property."166 The court dismissed
Huggins's exhortations to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis by stating: "where
the authorities supporting the prior rule have been drastically eroded, [and] ... the
holding of the [prior] case is counterproductive to its purposes, the situation is
appropriate for legal change by the court's decision." 16 7 Finally, the court rejected
the argument that the alienability of an easement in gross would unfairly burden
the servient estate, stating: "The servient tenement holder, however, is protected
because an easement holder may only use the easement in a manner consistent
with the intent of the parties that created the easement ' 163
ChiefJusticeWathen, in dissentjoined by Justice Clifford, asserted that"[t]he
intent of the parties is relevant in clarifying whether an easement is appurtenant or
in gross." 16 9 The Chief Justice stressed that once this determination was made,
"there is no proposition of Maine decisional law more firmly settled than the prin-
ciple that an easement in gross is personal and not assignable." 17 0 He criticized
158. See id. at 16.
159. See id. at 18.
160. Id. at 19.
161. Id. at 25.
162. See id. at 24.
163. 1& at23 (quoting Tripp v. Huff, 606 A.2d 792,793 (Me. 1992) (quoting Brown v. Heirs
of Maria Fuller, 347 A.2d 127, 130 (Me. 1975))) (emphasis omitted).
164. O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 1999 ME 71, 7, 728 A.2d 681,683.
165. Id. 8, 728 A.2d at 683.
166. Id. 10, 728 A.2d at 684.
167. Id. 11,728 A.2d at 684 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 998-99 (Me. 1982)).
168. Id.
169. Id. J 13, 728 A.2d at 685 (Wathen, CJ., dissenting).
170. Id.
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the court for abandoning the doctrine of stare decisis and stated that "[i]f there is a
need for changing the law, it is better addressed by the Legislature." 17 1 Finally,
Chief Justice Wathen concluded his dissent by lamenting that the decision "neces-
sarily acts on the past as well as the future and is capable of resurrecting long
forgotten easements to dash the settled expectations of landowners and title exam-
iners." 17 2
V. DIScussIoN
By holding that the question of the transferability of easements in gross should
be determined by the intent of the parties to the transaction, the Maine Law Court
followed a path of jurisprudence that has only been adopted by a handful of states. 17 3
Also, as Chief Justice Wathen noted in his dissenting opinion, the O'Donovan v.
Mclntosh1 74 decision completely overturned part of Maine's well-established ease-
ment law.17 5 The Chief Justice is correct: Maine courts have followed the rule
that easements in gross should be regarded as personal, nontransferable interests
in land for at least eighty-one years.176 Notwithstanding that fact, a close exami-
nation of other aspects of the easement law in Maine reveals, in many instances, a
trend toward the relaxation of the common law rules in order to favor the transfer-
ability of easement rights in general.
At common law, if one wished to secure a perpetual interest in land one was
compelled to use the word "heirs" in the granting instrument. 177 If this rule was
not complied with, no matter how clear the intent of the parties was to the contrary,
a life estate was created.178 This technical requirement could easily act to frus-
trate the will of the parties. In order to resolve this problem, the Maine Legislature
passed the Short Form Deeds Act in 1967.179 The Act expressly obviated the
requirement of technical words for the transfer of perpetual interests in land.180
Once passed, however, the courts did not apply the Act retroactively. 18 1 This
resulted in two different standards governing whether land interests would be held
to be perpetual, one for grants constructed prior to the passage of the Act, and the
other for grants constructed after that date. 182 Nevertheless, in 1999, Maine's
119th Legislature rewrote the Act not only so that it would apply retroactively, but
also to include a provision by which an individual may bring a civil action to
recover property lost due to the omission of the technical language in a deed writ-
171. Id. 14, 728 A.2d at 685.
172. Id.
173. See statutes and cases cited supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
174. 1999 ME 71,728A.2d 681.
175. See id. 14, 728 A.2d at 685 (Wathen, C.J., dissenting).
176. See supra Part W.
177. See Hall v. Hall, 106 Me. 389, 391, 76 A. 705,706 (1910); Brown v. Dickey, 106 Me.
97, 103, 75 A. 382, 385 (1909).
178. See Hall v. Hall, 106 Me. at 391, 76 A. at 706.
179. See P.L. 1967, ch. 377.
180. See iL
181. See, e.g., Gilder v. Mitchell, 668 A.2d 879 (Me. 1995).
182. See id. at 881 (holding that because the deed in the case was drafted in 1953, it therefore
"must be reviewed under common law principles governing the creation of easements before the
1967 adoption of the Short Form Deeds Act").
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ten prior to the passage of the originalAct. 183 The development of this area of the
property law clearly demonstrates an evolution of thinking towards allowing the
intent of the parties to determine whether a particular interest in land is assignable.
A second example of this evolution of thinking, which favors the assignability
of such property interests, can be seen in the courts' treatment of profits 4 prendre.
Maine has acknowledged the transferability of profits Ai prendre for over a cen-
tury.184 In determining what rights should be considered as profits ,A prendre the
courts have adopted an expansive view. They have not only held that a profit A
prendre is a right to take something directly from the soil,185 but they have ex-
tended the scope of the interest to include rights to engage in certain activities on
the soil for profit. For example, in the case of Engel v. Ayer,18 6 the Maine Law
Court held that a right to maintain booms on a pier was a profit ,a prendre. 187 In
coming to this conclusion, the court analyzed the commercial character of the right,
and found that the original grantor retained a right "either to use... himself, or to
let or sell to other persons."l88 The court held in a similar manner in the case of
Ring v. Walker.189 In Ring, the court decided that a right to use and maintain a log
sluice was a profit . prendre and not an easement in gross.190 There the court
probed into the parties' intent to determine what kind of interest was created, not-
ing "the language [of the grant] discloses a clear and unmistakable intention to
183. See PL. 1999, ch. 69, § I (codified at Me. REv. STAr. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 772-772-A (West
Supp. 1999)). The 1999 version of the Short Form Deeds Act states:
§ 772. Words of inheritance; habendum
1. Words of inheritance; habendum. In a conveyance or reservation of real
estate, the terms "heirs," "successors," "assigns[,]" "forever" or other technical words
of inheritance, or an habendum clause, are not necessary to convey or reserve an
estate in fee. A conveyance or reservation of real estate, whether made before or after
the effective date of this section, must be construed to convey or reserve an estate in
fee simple, unless a different intention clearly appears in the deed.
2. Preservation of rights. A person claiming an interest in real estate by reason
of the omission of technical words of inheritance or the lack of an habendum clause in
a deed that conveyed or reserved a property interest before October 7, 1967 may
preserve that claim by commencing a civil action for the recovery of that property in
the Superior Court or the District Court in the county or division in which the prop-
erty is located on or before December 31, 2002.
3. Limitation. After December 31, 2002, a person may not commence a civil
action for the recovery of property or enter that property under a claim of right based
on the absence of an habendum clause or technical words of inheritance in any deed.
4. Construction of laws. This section may not be construed to extend the period
for bringing of an action or for the doing of any other required act under any statute of
limitations.
5. Liberal construction. This section must be liberally construed to effect the
legislative purpose of clarifying title to land currently encumbered by ancient deeds
that lacked technical words of inheritance or an habendum clause.
Me. REv. SmAr. ANN. tit. 33, § 772 (West Supp. 1999).
184. See, e.g., Engel v. Ayer, 85 Me. 448.27 A. 352 (1893).
185. See Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83, 100 (1861) (finding a transferable profit a prendre in a right
to take seaweed off the land of another).
186. 85 Me. 448,27 A. 352 (1893).
187. See id. at 456-57, 27 A. at 355.
188. Id. at 454, 27A. at 355.
189. 87 Me. 550, 33 A. 174 (1895).
190. See id. at 558, 33 A. at 176.
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except a perpetual right, inheritable and transferable, and not an easement in gross,
or one limited to a lifetime." 19 1 These cases portray the court's early desire to find
some way to uphold the assignability of easement type rights if at all possible.
Maine also acknowledged this policy through an adherence to the traditional
rules of construction for grants of easements. These rules require that in order to
promote the alienability of land interests, whenever possible an easement should
be construed as being appurtenant to land rather than in gross.192 These rules of
construction have been adopted by several other states as well, regardless of their
position on the transferability of easements in gross. 193 In favoring findings of
easements appurtenant, states have sought to foster the transferability of easement
rights, while at the same time claiming to adhere to the old common law doctrine.
A number of courts have also shown an inclination toward favoring the alien-
ability of easements in gross by adopting the idea of the commercial easement. 194
Commercial easements are, at their core, nothing more than easements in gross
that a court decides were not meant to be personal.
But why have courts clung to the idea that easements in gross are simply not
transferable? Those who adhere to theAckroyd19 5 doctrine have voiced concerns
similar to those expressed in Boatman v. Lasley,19 6 regarding how heirs would
take and the possible imposition of unconsidered surcharges upon the servient es-
tate. However, these concerns are not as daunting as they might first appear. First,
concurrent estates have been recognized in the law for a number of centuries.197
The inheritors of such an interest in land would simply take in the manner pro-
vided in the granting instrument. A strict adherence to the intent of the grantor
would provide the initial protection fr6m any abuses of the right of way granted.
Further protections may lie in the ability of the grantor to bring an action for dam-
ages in the event any abuses do occur. 19 8
In light of all this, Justice Dana's reassurances in the O'Donovan opinion that
"the reasons supporting the rule against alienability are no longer compelling" ring
true. 199 These reasons also should assuage Chief Justice Wathen's concerns about
abusing the doctrine of stare decisis.200
191. Id. at 559, 33 A. at 176.
192. See LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984,987 (Me. 1979) (citing Davis v. Briggs, 117 Me.
536, 540, 105 A. 128, 129 (1918)).
193. See, e.g., Moylan v. Dykes, 226 Cal. Rptr. 673, 677 (Ct. App. 1986); Castonguay v.
Plourde, 699 A.2d 226,232 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997); Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Investors
Ltd., 734 So.2d 379, 388 (Fla. 1999); Allingham v. Nelson, 627 P.2d 1179, 1181 (Kan. Ct. App.
1981); Schwartzman v. Schoening, 669 N.E.2d 228,230 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); Spilker v. First
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VI. CONCLUSION
According to Article III of the United States Constitution, the power of the
federal judicial branch extends to actual cases and controversies. 20 1 Maine, in its
constitution, has granted broader powers to its courts.20 2 Nevertheless, the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court has stated that "the role of thejudicial branch in the frame-
work of government is to decide actual cases and controversies ... ."203 Because
courts determine the outcome of actual cases and controversies, it follows that
their decisions in these cases should be based upon the respective issues before
them. Therefore, courts generally only decide cases so far as necessary to effect a
satisfactory outcome.204
According to prevailing opinion, the outcome of the O'Donovan v. Mclntosh205
was correct. 206 The easement that McIntosh created in the deed to Huggins was
properly held to be alienable. However, the court's holding, that an easement is
alienable when the parties to its creation so intend, is overly broad. The court
should have recognized the commercial/noncommercial classification of easements
in gross by finding that the easement in question was commercial in nature. The
appellants asked the court to hold that the "Commercial Easement" was alien-
able.2 07 In fact, the appellants refer to the disputed easement as the "Commercial
Easement" throughout their brief.20 8 Further, the creating documents contained
ample evidence from which the court could have based a finding that the easement
was commercial in nature.209 The court would then have been able to restrict its
holding to this particular type of easement.
As a result of the O'Donovan decision, Maine courts must be wary of which
easements they allow to be transferred. Easements in gross are usually personal in
nature. Consequently, the courts must be ever vigilant to correctly interpret the
true intent of the parties. The burden of proving that an easement in gross is alien-
able should be placed upon the party that seeks to transfer it. This measure would
provide added insurance that those easements in gross that were intended to be
personal remain inalienable. Also, it would serve to discourage false claims from
being brought in the first place.
In deciding O'Donovan v. McIntosh, the Law Court adhered to a highly re-
garded yet sparsely followed jurisprudence. Only time will tell the real impact this
decision will have on property law in the state of Maine.
Michael J. Polak
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